Eriksson 4-1-4-1 Lazio 1999-2000 / Won the Treble, Salas 50 Goals

Lazio's midfield was considered one of the best in the world, and their playing style was characterized by verticality, quick transitions, and creativity from players like Verón and Nedved.
The team utilized a dynamic formation and adapted its tactics based on opponents, resulting in a fluid and versatile playstyle.

Despite defensive vulnerabilities, the team's offensive prowess led to trophies like the Serie A title and Coppa Italia, marking a peak in the club's history. The success of that season is contrasted with the subsequent decline of the team due to financial issues and changes in management.

That Lazio will be able to refute even the common belief that a great goalscorer is a conditio sine qua non for winning the tricolore. Because in fact, Bobo Vieri, transferred to Inter for 90 million, was not replaced with a striker of equal weight: the Roman management will fruitlessly pursue Nicolas Anelka, who will move to Real Madrid after a long courtship, and then Crespo and Claudio López (who will only arrive the following summer).

In the end, Vieri will be numerically replaced by the 23-year-old Simone Inzaghi, who had scored 15 goals in 30 matches at Piacenza in his Serie A debut, to whom Ravanelli, acquired in the winter transfer window, will be added.

A bit like Conte's first Juventus, Lazio will manage to compensate for the absence of a top scorer by getting goals from 15 players, but only one in double digits (Salas, 12 goals, followed by Veron, 8 goals, and Mihajlovic, 6), for a total of 64 goals, one less than the most prolific attacking team, the reigning champions Milan.

However, the biancocelesti had enhanced an already excellent midfield - which could count on Nedved and Conceição on the wings, as well as Almeyda in the center and a highly versatile Stankovic in the early part of his career - with Simeone, included in the deal for Vieri and valued at around 20 billion lire, Sensini and Verón, both brought from Parma for respectively 10 and 53 billion lire, which made "la brujita" the most expensive purchase in the club's history, surpassed the following summer by Crespo.

Already from the European Super Cup, Eriksson decides to base the team on the midfield, "the best in the world," at least according to the late Alberto D'Aguanno, deploying an extremely fluid 4-5-1 formation, which could be adapted into a 4-2-3-1, 4-3-3, or 4-4-2 depending on the players and the moments of the match, where Nedved, nominally playing as a left mezzala, or Mancini, starting from the left flank, accompany the central striker.

The winners of the last edition of the Cup Winners' Cup play against the European champions Manchester United for 90 minutes, manipulating the English midfield at their will and ending with a narrow victory (1-0, goal by Salas) that doesn't do justice to the dominance displayed on the field. "For the final, I knew I didn't have many strikers capable of lasting the full 90 minutes, so I relied on a 4-5-1 formation that convinced me," Eriksson declares after the match. "With Mancini or Nedved on the wings on one side and Lombardo or Conceição on the other, covered centrally by either Sensini or Almeyda, there's more space for everyone to move forward. In fact, in the first half, I really liked the team's style of play. In fact, I tell you that the Lazio I imagine is precisely this (...) I give a highly positive meaning to the ability of this team to build up the game."

Eriksson starts the season by fielding the striking duo of Salas and Inzaghi, but the experiment lasts only for the space of three matchdays: after a 3-0 victory against Torino at home on the third matchday, Simone Inzaghi and Salas will only play together from the start in two more matches in the return leg.

In the year of the Scudetto, the biancocelesti line up with a single central reference, potentially supported by either Mancini or Boksic, who in defensive phases drop back to the midfield line.

However, neither the current National Team coach nor the Croatian will manage to provide a significant contribution, the former hindered by his 36 years (for "Mancio", who won't even score a goal in the 1999/00 season, this marks his final year at Lazio and practically his last notable experience in playing football, except for a brief stint at Leicester in the winter of 2001), and the latter by chronic knee problems.

The Swedish coach, particularly in important matches, lines up with five midfielders, free to distribute spaces depending on contingencies: the only fixed points were the right winger, Conceição (or alternatively Stankovic), who surged down the flank with the steadiness and regularity of a freight train, and a holding midfielder, Almeyda or Sensini, to utilize their qualities in long-range play and defensive shielding.

The other three positions are variables, which, simplifying, are filled by another central midfielder closer to the holding one, a left winger with ample freedom of movement, and another mezzala/trequartista to bridge the midfield and attack.

The role of the positional midfielder is primarily interpreted by Simeone, less influential in the offensive phase compared to his time at Atlético Madrid. In Spain, he was a box-to-box midfielder ahead of his time, constantly pushing forward to accompany and finish actions, his dribbles reminiscent of a slalom by Marcel Hirscher in terms of impact and agility.

However, the Swedish coach primarily used him as a stabilizer for a team that easily stretched out, asking him to stay close to the holding midfielder to help cover the width of the field and press forward to engage opponents, thanks to an unmatched intensity.

For this reason, much like the fighting spirit expressed by the Atlético Madrid he would later manage from 2011, "Cholo" is remembered more as a man of aggression and quantity, overshadowing the equally significant technical aspects of his game.

At Lazio, he advances only when the action is consolidated or on set pieces, where he is a threat: out of the 30 goals scored in Serie A, a remarkable 19 were headers. In that season, he scores 5 goals, all headers and all in the last seven matchdays.

The first is the most crucial, as it secures an away victory against Juventus – who were 9 points ahead of Lazio before the match – reopening the Scudetto race. He will also find the net in the first leg of the Coppa Italia final (also, of course, with a header) against Inter, sealing the 2-1 victory that Eriksson's men will defend in the return leg at San Siro (0-0).

Nedved, on the other hand, oscillates between the center-left and a more external position, depending on the presence of a second striker or Verón: when the former Parma player is on the field, he covers the left flank defensively, while with Mancini or Boksic, he tightens up alongside the holding midfielder when the ball is lost.

Although his offensive gameplay doesn't change much in practice, he roams across the entire front, alternating between inside tracks and inside-outside cuts. The same applies to Verón, formally a left winger, or a central mezzala/trequartista when Nedved covers the width, whose purpose remains centralizing the game and creating numerical superiority in the ball zone.

In the last two months of the season, when Lazio needed to win practically all matches to catch up with Juventus, Eriksson proposed an even more daring formation, with only one defensive midfielder (either Almeyda, Sensini, or Simeone), accompanied by two trequartisti (Verón and Nedved), two forwards (either Inzaghi or Salas in the center, along with either Boksic or Mancini on the left wing), and Conceição on the right.

One of Lazio's most offensive versions, here in the European Super Cup against Manchester United: two forwards, Mancini and Salas, and three offensive midfielders, Stankovic, Nedved, and Verón, with the latter two moving behind the second English line, covered by Almeyda.

Verticality and the Importance of Verón and Nedved

In a frenetic and direct style of football like that of the 1990s, where the goal is to reach the opponent's goal as quickly as possible while minimizing risks, and control of the game is expressed more through territorial supremacy than ball possession, Lazio plays an equally vertical football, whose effectiveness increases against long teams, where it can take advantage of space to frequently find the most creative players, organizing a more reasoned offensive phase.

In the early stages of the game, Lazio tries to gain ground and expand the distances within the opponent's formation through long play: it relies on the passes from defenders (particularly Nesta and Mihajlovic) or alternatively from a midfielder (Simeone and Almeyda) to the striker, while the two central midfielders move behind the opponent's midfield line to collect any second balls.

If the forward controls the ball, they pass it to the nearest teammate who, if no useful passing lanes are available ahead, switches to the wing player. The wing player then either opts for a cross from the byline or the edge of the box, with the central striker, winger, and mezzala on the weak side filling the box.

If the ball comes out from the fullbacks, it goes to the high-positioned wing player on the same side, who attacks the space behind the defensive line, or receives the ball to dribble past the marker, aiming to create numerical superiority to be utilized in the final 40 meters.

Inzaghi and Salas, alternately fielded, become the stepping stones used to progress up the field. The two forwards are tasked with dropping deeper and playing as a pivot for their teammates.

This strategy highlights the physical and technical qualities of the Chilean, who is skilled at linking up with teammates, shielding the ball, and withstanding challenges despite his modest height (173 cm according to Wikipedia).

Salas attracts the marking defender out of position, plays a quick pass, and returns to the box to receive a cross, utilizing his powerful header. Inzaghi, on the other hand, is more of a finisher who excels at attacking depth and closing lateral plays.

The 1999/2000 season remains the pinnacle of his career, with a total of 19 goals, including 9 in 11 Champions League appearances, four of which were scored in a single match, the 5-1 victory against Marseille in the second group stage.

When they move the ball quickly and seek to go deep immediately, Lazio refines their play through the flanks because, without proper possession consolidation, they struggle to occupy the central attacking third.

On the wings, however, they progress up the field more naturally: thanks to overlapping runs by the left-back, Pancaro or Favalli, and the extended dribbling runs of a player like Conceição on the right, they manage to draw opponents to the strong side.

The opponents, in sliding laterally, expose the center and create space for the midfielders' runs. It's no coincidence that several goals have come from crosses.

However, Lazio becomes a devastating and entertaining team when they manage to organize their offensive phase. They achieve this when they play through the midfield, specifically when Verón and Nedved are set up for continuous play.

The Argentine and the Czech have contrasting relationships with the ball: Verón is drawn to it like a metal to a magnet, while Nedved moves away from it to create space and be available for a pass while on the run.

Verón positions himself around the ball to provide a safe passing lane for his teammates. Once he receives the ball, he decides how to break the opponent's lines: with a switch of play, a direct pass, or a dribble.

Although sometimes a forced style of play, the benefits (positional advantages/key passes/shots) far outweigh the costs (lost balls/counterattacks).

"Verón is our playmaker. When he performs well, the entire team performs well," acknowledges Eriksson, who faced difficulties between the end of the first half of the season and the beginning of the second half, coinciding with a downturn in Verón's form.

In the first 12 matches of 2000, Lazio only gained 19 points, managing just two draws against teams like Venezia, Cagliari, Reggina, and Verona. Despite the mid-season dip, Verón would experience one of his best seasons, the only one in his career in which he reached double figures (eight goals in Serie A and two in the Champions League). A year in which he established himself as one of the world's best playmakers, even though he was somewhat overshadowed in Italy by the presence of other greats like Zidane and Rui Costa.

Furthermore, Lazio demonstrates itself to be a modern team in terms of exploiting vertical corridors: while Conceição firmly guards the right flank, with Negro overlapping only when the Portuguese player requires assistance against a 1 vs 2 situation, more fluid interactions occur on the center-left between the fullback, the winger/second striker, and the interior midfielder.

The catalyst in these cases is Nedved: his runs, with or without the ball, determine the positional structure on his side. If the Czech player converges towards the center around the midfield line, the attacking midfielder compensates by occupying the wide area or the space behind the midfield (with the defender pushing forward). If he spreads out, the wide forward fills the area.

Nedved's acceleration allows Lazio to advance centrally, pulling opponents out of position and opening up spaces and passing lanes, particularly for the insertion of an interior midfielder.

Nedved becomes a significant factor when he pairs up with Boksic or, even better, with Pancaro, a player who impressed me retrospectively for his ambidexterity, speed, and determination. A full-back not just in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality in ball control and finishing.

Another two examples of Lazio's offensive plays triggered by Nedved: in the first case, the Czech player moves inwards and Boksic makes the opposite movement; in the second case, the same pairing occurs with the Croatian forward, but this time Inzaghi vacates the area to set up Stankovic's run.

Another precious resource for this team is set-pieces, which accounted for 23 of the total 64 goals scored in the league, almost 36% of the total. For comparison, Lazio's last season with 89 goals saw 26 from set-pieces, but with four more matchdays and nine penalties, two more than those awarded to Eriksson's men.

Both Verón and Mihajlovic are dangerous from direct and indirect free-kicks, with the former using a lofted shot and the latter a curling shot on the inside of his foot. Mihajlovic takes corners from the right, while Verón takes those from the left.

Against Verona, Verón even scored directly from a corner kick. The central defender, after scoring 9 goals the previous year, did even better this season, reaching a total of 13 goals across Serie A, Coppa Italia, and the Champions League, including 7 from direct free-kicks.

An Ambitious Defensive Phase

Although they often stretched and placed 4-5 players above the ball line, Lazio never aggressively pursued ball recovery in high zones. Their objective was rather to compact the team into a 4-1-4-1 formation, with the midfield line dropping and the defensive line advancing to reduce distances between units.

Eriksson's team never pressed the opponent's initial build-up either; at most, one forward would advance to around 60-70 meters to pressure the ball carrier and force them into making a mistake.

The problem is that, loving wide spaces but without any re-aggression or proper preventive attitudes, Lazio inevitably splits in two when possession is lost: one line formed by the four defenders, with the defensive midfielder dropping back alongside them, and further up the field, the other five offensive players, arranged in a more or less orderly manner. If the team fails to fully reform the first line, during defensive transitions, a block of 3-4 players is formed to guard the center of the field, or even worse, the defensive midfielder and positional midfielder end up defending the entire width of the field.

A bold choice, Eriksson's decision to focus the basic eleven on the offensive phase: Lazio becomes vulnerable to counterattacks and plays between the lines, but at the same time, it aligns with a defensive style that prefers to defend by moving forward rather than backward.

In fact, Mihajlovic and Nesta like to break the line to challenge the player with the ball far from the goal, in order to disrupt the opponent's action as quickly as possible and deny depth.

In particular, Nesta's sliding tackle becomes his trademark, almost an inevitable reaction when facing a player within his orbit (even from a distance of up to three meters) who reveals the ball.

The timing and precision of a player who, with almost every challenge, risks a card or being bypassed, but most of the time enters with a violence and brutality that transform into elegance due to the surgical precision of his intervention, whether frontal or lateral, with his right leg extended forward.

This is why the nickname "perfect storm," attributed to him by Milan's commentator-fan Carlo Pellegatti, exemplifies his game - lightning-fast in timing and thunderous in execution - which mercilessly descends upon the opponent. A kind of seemingly risky "all in" move that actually represents a play with a very high probability of success.

More generally, the type of marking can vary depending on the match, although the basic approach is a mixed zone marking. For instance, against teams that deploy many players or have particularly mobile players, it can be refined into a purer zone marking.

Notably, Nesta remains the defender most inclined to break the line. Against teams that employ only one wide player per flank, such as Zaccheroni's Milan or Ancelotti's Juventus, when a central forward widens, the fullback steps out to engage the attacker, while the wide player drops back to provide cover.

In passive defensive phases, the white-and-blue team drops back into the first third of the field, forming a 4-1-4-1 formation that aims to maintain order and uniform coverage of spaces.

However, in reality, this is a team that struggles to sustain extended periods without the ball, often getting drawn out of position and conceding good scoring opportunities.

Additionally, the defensive line, while excelling in defending away from the goal (even in situations of parity or numerical disadvantage), is almost inherently forced to endure pressure as it lacks consistent support from other areas of the team.

Ultimately, Eriksson's team manages to achieve a total of 26 clean sheets, but they also concede 54 goals in 59 matches, averaging almost one goal conceded every 90 minutes.